The Elephant in the Room: Helping Delaware Courts Develop Law to End Systemic Short-Term Bias in Corporate Decision-Making by McNeil, Kenneth & Johnson, Keith
Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review 
Volume 8 Issue 1 
2018 
The Elephant in the Room: Helping Delaware Courts Develop Law 
to End Systemic Short-Term Bias in Corporate Decision-Making 
Kenneth McNeil 
Susman Godfrey L.L.P. 
Keith Johnson 
Reinhart Boerner Van Deuren, s.c. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mbelr 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Courts Commons, Securities Law Commons, and 
the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kenneth McNeil & Keith Johnson, The Elephant in the Room: Helping Delaware Courts Develop Law to End 
Systemic Short-Term Bias in Corporate Decision-Making, 8 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 1 (2018). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mbelr/vol8/iss1/2 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review by 
an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please 
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM: HELPING 
DELAWARE COURTS DEVELOP LAW TO 
END SYSTEMIC SHORT-TERM BIAS IN 
CORPORATE DECISION-MAKING
Kenneth McNeil, Susman Godfrey L.L.P.*
Keith Johnson, Reinhart Boerner Van Deuren s.c.**,1
Short-termism in corporate decision-making is as problematic for long-term 
investors as relying on a three-mile radar on a supertanker. It is totally 
inadequate for handling the long-term risks and opportunities faced by the 
modern corporation. Yet recent empirical research shows that up to 85% of 
the S&P 1500 have no long-term planning.  This is costing pension funds and 
other long-term investors dearly. For instance, the small minority of 
companies that do long-term planning and risk management had a long-term 
profitability that was 81% higher than their peers during the 2001–2014 
period—with less stock volatility that costs investors dearly as well. This 
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corporate short-termism mindset is even more troubling given that at least half 
of the value of the companies in the S&P 1500 is generated by expectations for 
realization of future value. Long-term investors therefore face a long-term 
expectations pipeline of hoped-for returns without a plan by corporations to 
back it up.  The tragic result: this short-termism mindset appears to have a 
substantial depressing impact on long-term market returns while increasing 
long-term risk exposure. Both have contributed to the significantly 
underfunded status of many pension funds today.
Delaware courts, the primary referees of corporate director fiduciary duties in 
the United States, are so frustrated with the persistent effects of short-term 
pressures—including corporate fraud and compliance breaches—that they are 
actively encouraging investors to bring the right cases to help change the 
rules. This Article examines the effects of short-termism and the Delaware 
judiciary’s responses to it. It then shows how existing Delaware law could be 
extended to address the underlying causes of corporate short-term bias, rather 
than merely imposing punishment on the symptoms.
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INTRODUCTION
Pension funds and other investors with long-term liabilities are at a water-
shed moment—facing both a life-threatening crisis and an unexpected oppor-
tunity to resolve their predicament through use of the Delaware courts.2 Perva-
sive short-termism in corporate decision-making is the underlying elephant-in-
the-room crisis.
Recent empirical research shows short-termism is a recipe for disaster for 
pension funds and other long-term institutional investors. Over half of the mar-
ket value of the S&P 1500 is now future value.3 Corporations with long-term
planning have generated 81% more long-term profits from 2001–2014 than oth-
er corporations without such planning—and with far less volatility.4 Yet 85% of
the S&P 1500 have no long-term strategic business plan longer than three to 
five years.5 To the contrary, most directors myopically focus on quarterly re-
turns—with all the accompanying risk and corner-cutting.6 The amount of mon-
ey lost by long-term investors is enormous, despite it being largely invisible to 
investors who exclusively use market-relative performance benchmarks. Corpo-
rate governance reform efforts by pension funds and other shareholders have 
2. See, e.g., Knowledge@Wharton, Underfunded Pensions: Tackling an ‘Invisible Crisis,’
WHARTON (Jan. 26, 2015), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/underfunded-pensions-
tackling-an-invisible-crisis/ (noting that “Chicago’s unfunded liabilities are 10 times its revenues.”); 
see also David Crane, California’s $500-billion pension time bomb, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2010), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/06/opinion/la-oe-crane6-2010apr06 (“The state of California’s
real unfunded pension debt clocks in at more than $500 billion, nearly eight times greater than offi-
cially reported.”); Darren Behar, Fears of Pensions Timebomb, DAILY MAIL, http://
www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-85707/Fears-pensions-timebomb.html (last visited Nov. 29, 
2018).
3. Dominic Barton, James Manyika, & Sarah Keohane Williamson, Finally, Evidence That 
Managing for the Long Term Pays Off, HARV. BUS. REV. (February 9, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/
02/finally-proof-that-managing-for-the-long-term-pays-off (“New research . . . found that compa-
nies that operate with a true long-term mindset have consistently outperformed their industry peers 
since 2001 across almost every financial measure that matters.”).
4. Id. (“From 2001 to 2014 those managing for the long term cumulatively increased their 
economic profit by 63% more than the other companies. By 2014 their annual economic profit was 
81% larger than their peers, a tribute to superior capital allocation that led to fundamental value cre-
ation.”).
5. See MARK VAN CLIEAF, STEPHAN O’BYRNE & KAREL LEEFLANG, THE ALIGNMENT GAP 
BETWEEN CREATING VALUE, PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT, AND LONG-TERM INCENTIVE DESIGN 
(2014), https://irrcinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/alignment-gap-study1.pdf.
6. Alex Edmans, Vivian Fang & Allen Huang, The Long-Term Consequences of Short-
Term Incentives 2 (Oct. 4, 2017) (unpublished working paper), https://irrcinstitute.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/12/13-Huang-Edmans-Fang-The-Long-Term-Consequences-of-Short-Term-
Incentives.pdf (“The concern with short-term incentives is that they lead to the CEO taking myopic 
actions that boost the short-term stock price at the expense of long-run value.”); see also DOMINIC 
BARTON, JONATHAN BAILEY & JOSHUA ZOFFER, RISING TO THE CHALLENGE OF SHORT-TERMISM
(2015), https://www.fcltglobal.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/fclt-global-rising-
to-the-challenge.pdf.
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made no serious dent in this short-termism problem. Given this factual land-
scape, it is no surprise that many pension funds are underfunded.7
However, there is an unexpected and powerful ally emerging to reverse this 
harmful trend: the Delaware courts. Indeed, the Delaware courts are seeking as-
sistance from pension funds and other long-term investors in the battle. It is not 
often that courts actively seek help from the outside. Here is why they have 
broken that norm to combat this problem:
Delaware courts are the key architects that define the rules of the game for 
corporate decision-making. In that role, they are on the front lines dealing every 
day with the magnitude of corporate meltdowns and financial cataclysms of re-
cent history. From that front-line perspective, it is obvious to Delaware courts 
that much of the corporate fraud and failure to comply with laws that triggers 
meltdowns are merely symptoms of short-termism.
As a result, Delaware courts are showing increased willingness to broaden 
the relevant director fiduciary duties that govern the process of corporate risk-
assessment and decision-making. But the Delaware courts cannot bring these 
cases on their own.  They need enlightened investors to seek an extension of 
Delaware law to coincide with what the United Kingdom and European Union 
have already done, i.e., require directors to consider long-term consequences in 
decisions.8 Delaware courts also offer another valuable reform tool for long-
term investors—the Delaware books and records statute—to give leverage to 
current corporate governance reform efforts focused on corporate disclosure and 
cooperative shareholder engagement. 9
This crisis, like Enron, Worldcom, Lehman Brothers, and the ever-
increasing volume of calamities caused by unsustainable business models, is 
exaggerated by an economic culture incentivized to seek quick wins at the ex-
pense of long-term risks or long-term sustainable profits.10 But these fraud-
related collapses are often mere symptoms of the bigger problem of short-
termism in corporate decision-making generally. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Chief Justice 
of the Delaware Supreme Court, has put the problem and the solution succinct-
ly:
7. Michael Edesess, The Reason Underfunded Pensions are a Disaster Waiting to Happen,
MARKETWATCH (Apr. 5, 2017, 2:25 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-reason-
underfunded-pensions-are-a-disaster-waiting-to-happen-2017-04-03; see also Thomas Born, Nearly 
Half of Americans Will Retire Broke, RT.COM (Mar. 17, 2018, 8:22 AM), https://www.rt.com/
business/421569-crisis-us-half-retire-broke/.
8. See, e.g., The UK Companies Act (2006) §172(1) (requiring directors to have regard for 
“the likely consequences of any decision in the long term.”).
9. See Tom McParland, Chancery Court Opens Health Care Company’s Documents to In-
vestors, DEL. BUS. CT. INSIDER (Mar. 1, 2018, 5:17 PM), https://www.law.com/delbizcourt/2018/
03/01/chancery-court-opens-health-care-companys-documents-to-investors/?kw=Chancery%20
Court%20Opens%20Health%20Care%20Company%27s%20Documents%20to%20Investor.
10. See Malcolm Salter, How Short-Termism Invites Corruption . . .And What to Do About 
It, HARV. BUS. SCH. (Apr. 2012), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/12-
094_8260785f-0417-45d1-8abc-0afe86f87eaa.pdf.
Fall 2018] The Elephant in the Room 5
[T]o foster sustainable economic growth, stockholders themselves must act like 
genuine investors, who are interested in the creation and preservation of long-term 
wealth, not short-term movements in stock price.11
Our thesis is that the Delaware courts—frustrated by this trend of short-
termism—have been laying the legal groundwork to adapt corporate jurispru-
dence—and particularly the Business Judgment Rule (“BJR”)—to include long-
term strategic risk planning processes. The legal devices necessary to obtain ev-
idence substantiating such claims already exist.12 Delaware jurists have signaled 
their willingness to explore this pathway of responsible corporate planning. Fur-
thermore, long-term planning is a goal that public policy should encourage, in 
light of recent legal13 and economic history.14 Finally, the ideal plaintiff has 
awakened: pension-funds and similar institutional investors. As stewards of as-
sets invested to cover longstanding obligations, these institutional investors owe 
fiduciary duties with the most literal requirements for long-term planning.15
This uniquely situates them to drive Delaware fiduciary duty law in a direction 
that emphasizes a focus on long-term corporate well-being.
In this Article, we chart a path through the law, demonstrating how the BJR 
has evolved and narrowed in exculpatory scope over time. We highlight recent 
cases and prominent jurists that are explicit in their support of long-term strate-
gic planning as a core corporate goal. We chart out a new framework that in-
cludes a process requirement for long-term risk evaluation. We suggest that the 
time is right for a test case to push this theory.
Finally, we identify the ideal plaintiffs for such a test case that have the 
strongest incentive to evolve the law: pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, 
foundations, and similar asset owners—institutional entities with litigation 
power that are organized for the purpose of long-term and sustainable wealth 
creation. These institutional stewards of long-term funds have an obligation to 
provide profits for hundreds of years and the power to influence corporate di-
rectors to consider long-term risks and profitability.
11. Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can 
Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and 
Think Long Term? 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 26 (2010).
12. McParland, supra note 9.
13. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Ratchet: The Courts’ Role in Eroding ‘We the Peo-
ple’s’ Ability to Constrain Our Corporate Creations, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 423, 437 (2016) 
(describing how the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 
U.S. 310 (2010), augmented corporate power to influence society through political lobbying and 
mass media).
14. See, e.g., The 2008 Financial Crisis: How It All Began, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 17, 2017, 
3:17 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-2008-financial-crisis-how-it-all-began-1502997466.
15. DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S LAST
BEST WEAPON (2018).
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I. THE IMBALANCE BETWEEN LONG-TERM INVESTOR GOALS AND 
SHORT-TERMISM IN CORPORATE DECISION-MAKING
Just a few simple facts highlight how far out of balance—and intractable—
the situation has become. Corporations that engaged in long-term planning had 
profits 81% higher between 2001 and 2014—with less volatility—than other 
firms.16 Because pension funds and other institutional investors control about 
70% of the U.S. equities market, market pressures alone should therefore en-
courage long-term strategic planning.17
Yet the opposite is happening in the overall corporate marketplace. At least 
50% of the current value of the top 1500 S&P corporations is future value. And 
the trend toward future value as a higher percentage of total equity value is 
growing.18 As future value has increased (often to 20 times earnings or more), a 
huge disconnect has developed in companies where there is no strategic assess-
ment of long-term profitability. Eighty-five percent of these corporations have 
no strategic planning horizon longer than 5 years.19 Seventy-five percent of 
them have no long-term measures of capital efficiency.20 Eighty-five percent 
have no disclosed future value metrics—like amount of innovation and research 
and development (“R&D”).21 Eighty-five percent have long-term incentive plan 
performance periods of less than 3 years.22  Finally—and astoundingly—only 
100 of the top S&P 1500 companies do any significant R&D, which is key to 
long-term value maximization in today’s world.23
To make matters even worse, this problem operates within a black box sys-
tem. The long-term assessment process is not merely flawed; there is also little 
disclosure. The result is that institutional investors—and pension funds in par-
ticular—cannot effectively monitor and evaluate how a company will manage 
its large component of future value or the extent to which that future value 
component may realistically be a sham.
16. See Barton et. al., supra note 3.
17. Id.
18. See VAN CLIEAF ET. AL., supra note 5, at 10.
19. See Dominic Barton et. al., Where Companies with a Long-Term View Outperform Their 
Peers, MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST. (Feb. 2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/long-term-
capitalism/where-companies-with-a-long-term-view-outperform-their-peers (“Recent surveys of C-
suite executives that we have conducted suggest that pressure to deliver strong short-term results 
has increased in the past five years and, as a result, many executives believe their companies are 
using excessively short time horizons in their strategic planning.”).
20. Heather Kerr & Hannah Dumas, Executive Incentive Plans: How Leading Companies 
Pay for Performance, EQUILAR (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.equilar.com/reports/35-executive-
incentive-plans.html.
21. See VAN CLIEAF ET. AL., supra note 5, at 61.
22. Id. at 65.
23. Id.
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This is not merely an abstract or academic problem. Pension funds and their 
delegated fiduciary agents owe strong legal duties to millions of workers.24 As 
with the corporations themselves, these fiduciaries are making vital investment 
decisions with other people’s money. The ultimate fund beneficiaries must have 
a long-term investment horizon to protect their retirement or meet their other 
long-term savings goals.25 But that is far too often not happening with their fund 
investments at the corporate level. Corporate reform efforts by institutional in-
vestors are not yet making a serious dent in these stark realities of short-
termism.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF DELAWARE BREACH OF FIDUCIARY LAW AND THE 
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE IN RESPONSE TO 
FRUSTRATION OVER SHORT-TERMISM
It is not just enlightened long-term investors that are frustrated with short-
termism in corporate decision-making. Delaware courts—the referees of the 
rules of the game for corporate director fiduciary duties—are frustrated as well 
and have expressed, on multiple occasions, a willingness to do something about 
it. And they are asking for help from long-term investors like pension funds to 
do it.
A. The Delaware Courts’ Frustration with Short-Termism and 
Its Request for Help from Long-Term Investors
Amongst the leaders of change is none other than Delaware Chief Justice 
Leo Strine, Jr., a distinguished, internationally recognized legal scholar and 
judge. To understand the Delaware Supreme Court’s frustration, one need look 
no further than to a number of his speeches and articles.
In July 2005, before becoming Chief Justice Strine, gave a speech to the Eu-
ropean Policy Forum in London, stating: “[M]ost of us think the market’s fet-
ishistic preoccupation with quarter-to-quarter profits is stupid. Anyone who is 
24. See, e.g., T. Leigh Anenson, Public Pensions and Fiduciary Law: A View from Equity,
50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 251, 254 (2017) (“All states recognize that pension assets are held in trust 
and that managers are fiduciaries.”).
25. See Larry Fink, Annual Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose, BLACKROCK (Jan. 16, 
2018), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter (“Without a 
sense of purpose, no company, either public or private, can achieve its full potential. It will ulti-
mately lose the license to operate from key stakeholders. It will succumb to short-term pressures to 
distribute earnings, and, in the process, sacrifice investments in employee development, innovation, 
and capital expenditures that are necessary for long-term growth. It will remain exposed to activist 
campaigns that articulate a clearer goal, even if that goal serves only the shortest and narrowest of 
objectives. And ultimately, that company will provide subpar returns to the investors who depend 
on it to finance their retirement, home purchases, or higher education.”).
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honest will admit that this obsessional behavior contributed to wrongdoing at 
corporations like Enron and Health South.”26
Then, in 2010, Strine wrote a seminal article in THE BUSINESS LAWYER,
stating that corporations exist to build long-term “durable wealth”—not short-
term profits: “To build wealth in a durable manner, corporations need to commit 
capital to long-term endeavors, often involving a lag time between the invest-
ment of capital and the achievement of profit, a long time during which activi-
ties like research and development occur.”27 In that same article, Strine went 
further to state a virtual mantra adopted by many pension funds and long-term
investors—corporations are here to generate “societal wealth”:
The hoped-for outcome of this [corporate] risk taking, in the aggregate, is an in-
crease in societal wealth, and not simply through the generation of profits. Rather, 
to generate profits, corporations have an incentive to employ workers and develop 
innovative products and services, and to engage in other activities that increase so-
cietal wealth.28
Strine ended by chastising long-term investors like pension funds for not 
pressing corporations harder to achieve “sustainable wealth”:
In sum, real investors want what we as a society want and we as end-user, individ-
ual investors want, which is for corporations to create sustainable wealth.  Until, 
however, the institutions who control and churn American stocks actually act and 
think like investors themselves, it is unrealistic to think that the corporations they 
influence will be well-positioned to advance that widely shared objective . . . . to 
foster sustainable economic growth, stockholders themselves must act like genuine 
investors, who are interested in the creation and preservation of long-term wealth, 
not short-term movements in stock price.29
It is rare that a Court seeks help from a party to help solve a problem—it is 
usually the other way around. That is a “man-bites-dog” story. That is real news 
that should not be ignored by pension funds and other long-term investors.
B. Delaware Courts’ Strong Backing of Long-Term Value Maximization as a 
Key Corporate Goal
Delaware courts are increasingly backing up their strong words with judicial 
opinions and language aimed at shifting the balance back towards long-term 
goals and strategy in corporate decision-making. Delaware courts have long 
stressed that the clear, unequivocal goal of a director’s fiduciary duty to share-
holders is to act in the “best interest” of shareholders.30 To that end, Delaware 
26. See Stephen Taub, Influential Delaware Judge Slams Sarbox, CFO (Jul. 6, 2005), http://
www.cfo.com/article.cfm/4149256.
27. Strine, supra note 13, at 3.
28. Id. at 2.
29. Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
30. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“It is a presumption that in making a 
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the 
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”) (citations omitted).
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[common law] literally built a “best interest” goal into the very definition of a 
corporate director’s fiduciary duty.31 That “best interest” goal is also built into 
the very definition of Delaware’s BJR presumption.32
Further, Delaware courts have increasingly stressed long-term strategic 
planning as part of that “best interest” goal since at least 1986—and with grow-
ing frequency over the past several years after the fallout of Enron and the glob-
al financial crisis.33 In just the past five years, Delaware courts have published 
opinions emphasizing long-term strategy with the following quotes: Directors 
must “maximize the value of the corporation over the long term.”34 Directors 
must “maximize [the corporation’s] value over the long-term for the benefit of 
its shareholders.”35 Directors must “maximize the value of the corporation over 
the long-term for the benefit of the providers of equity capital.”36
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the “best interest” goal includes 
an obligation to maximize the value of the corporation over the long-term rather 
than the short term. Indeed, as a corollary, Justice Strine is explicit that directors 
are not required to maximize short-term profits at the expense of long-term 
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See generally Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (“It is the ob-
ligation of directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run interests of the corpora-
tion’s stockholders; that they may sometimes do so ‘at the expense’ of others (even assuming that a 
transaction which one may refuse to enter into can meaningfully be said to be at his expense) does 
not for that reason constitute a breach of duty.”) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
34. Frederick Hsu Living Tr. v. ODN Holding Corp., No. 12108-VCL, 2017 WL 1437308, 
at *18–19 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 2017), as corrected (Apr. 24, 2017) (“In terms of the standard of con-
duct, therefore, the fiduciary relationship requires that the directors act prudently, loyally, and in 
good faith to maximize the value of the corporation over the long-term for the benefit of the provid-
ers of presumptively permanent equity capital, as warranted for an entity with a presumptively per-
petual life in which the residual claimants have locked in their investment. . . . The fact that some 
holders of shares might be market participants who are eager to sell and would prefer a higher near-
term market price likewise does not alter the presumptively long-term fiduciary focus.”) (emphasis 
added). Although the case involved a unique and complex set of facts, a breach of the duty of dis-
closure was found in a corporate sale where it was not disclosed to shareholders that the company’s
valuation under its existing five-year plan yielded a higher value than the sale. In re PLX Tech., Inc. 
S’holders Litig., Consl. C.A. No. 9880-VCL, 2018 WL 5018535, at *101–02 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 
2018) (The Court found a breach of fiduciary duty where the company was sold under pressure 
from a private equity investor to provide current returns when the board had a viable plan in place to 
generate more value over the long term by remaining independent. The Court noted: “particular 
types of investors may espouse short-term investment strategies and structure their affairs to benefit 
economically from those [short-term] strategies, thereby creating a divergent interest in pursuing 
short-term performance at the expense of long-term wealth.”).
35. In re Rural Metro Corp., 88 A.3d 54, 80 (Del. Ch. 2014), aff’d sub nom. RBC Capital 
Mkts., LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816 (Del. 2015) (“More concretely, the fiduciary relationship be-
tween the Board and Rural’s stockholders required that the directors act prudently, loyally, and in 
good faith to maximize Rural’s value over the long-term for the benefit of its stockholders.”).
36. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 37 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“In terms of the stand-
ard of conduct, the duty of loyalty therefore mandates that directors maximize the value of the cor-
poration over the long-term for the benefit of the providers of equity capital, as warranted for an 
entity with perpetual life in which the residual claimants have locked in their investment.”).
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planning37 and further can even prioritize the long-term interests of shareholders 
over short-term interests of bondholders.38 But there is no common law that 
clearly establishes the opposite. That is, there is no clear Delaware authority 
condoning a corporate director that destroys the long-term future of a company 
for short-term profit. Rather the opposite—the most prominent examples of 
such trade-offs have historically been failures like the mortgage-backed securi-
ties crisis.39 All of the foregoing establishes that corporate directors owe share-
holders a fiduciary duty to build long-term value. Such a maxim logically re-
quires some systematic strategic assessment of the long-term benefits and 
risks—as part of a decision-making process based on reasonably adequate in-
formation. Without some reasonable process by which to evaluate long-term 
risk, it is impossible for corporate directors to satisfy their fiduciary obligation 
to build long-term wealth.
C. Delaware’s Business Judgment Rule as an Offsetting Obstacle to Director 
Liability for Short-term Bias in Corporate Decision-Making
So why, if Delaware courts solidly back “maximizing value of the corpora-
tion over the long-term” as the goal of corporate decision-making, has it not put 
a quick end to the short-termism reflected in what appears to be 85% of the 
S&P 1500, for example?
There are two reasonable explanations. First, court-made law, in common 
law and equity, typically progresses on a case-by-case basis. As former Chief 
Justice Veasy of the Delaware Supreme Court has stated, judges are like 
“clams.”40 They must wait for a case to be brought to them. Second is the Del-
aware BJR, which was framed a century ago in the 1930s with the heavy hand 
of New York City corporate lawyers protecting their corporate clients as much 
as possible from liability for corporate decisions.41
The BJR creates a presumption that corporate officers and directors “acted 
on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken 
37. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea That For-Profit Corporations 
Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 155 (2012) (“By so stating, I do not mean to imply that 
the corporate law requires directors to maximize short-term profits for stockholders.”).
38. See Katz, 508 A.2d at 879.
39. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE
(2010).
40. E. Norman Veasey & Michael P. Dooley, The Role of Corporate Litigation in the Twen-
ty-First Century, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 131, 133 (2000) (“We take the cases as they come to us. The 
courts sit like clams in the water waiting for whatever is brought by the tides. We don’t give adviso-
ry opinions. We don’t reach out to pluck the interesting issues of the day to make a ruling. We wait 
for our jurisdiction to be invoked.”).
41. See generally Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business 
Judgment Rule, Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 410 (2013) (tracing the history of the 
business judgment rule in Delaware).
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was in the best interests of the company [and its shareholders].”42 In the ab-
stract, the BJR is meant to provide an offsetting “weight” in the balance against 
just automatically imposing liability on a director for a bad corporate decision 
that results in losses—long-term or short-term—after the fact.
On the one hand, Delaware courts have imposed a fiduciary duty of care 
and loyalty upon corporate directors to ensure there is a process of informed 
choice in corporate decision-making. After all, directors are the representatives 
of the shareholders in a corporation—and in that sense are like trustees of other 
people’s money. A cornerstone of that fiduciary duty is that a director’s deci-
sions involving other people’s money should be made only after a reasonable 
and rational process of information gathering and assessment. It should not be 
riverboat gambling.
On the other hand, corporate directors are more than just trustees that invest 
money; they are entrepreneurs who act on behalf of shareholders and take risks. 
Given this reality, a rigid trustee fiduciary duty obligation did not fit directors. 
Indeed, Delaware courts have been emphatic that courts are not in a good posi-
tion to second-guess the risk-taking decisions of directors in hindsight.43 It 
would also discourage directors from serving on corporate boards if they faced 
second-guessing by courts of risky decisions that turned out poorly.
As a result, the Delaware courts have made the focus of a director’s fiduci-
ary duties of care and loyalty the adequacy of the process of decision-making 
rather than the decision itself. The process is the means of achieving a good de-
cision. In turn, the director’s duty of care and duty of loyalty as fiduciary obli-
gations are the means to insure a good process of decision-making—to achieve 
the end or goal of “the best interest” of shareholders, which presumptively in-
cludes long-term value maximization.44
That focus on process is consistent with risk-assessment principles in tort
law.45 A party that takes reasonable steps to assess risks before making an in-
42. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 746–47 (Del. Ch. 2005), (citing 
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“The business judgment rule is not actually a
substantive rule of law, but instead it is a presumption that ‘in making a business decision the direc-
tors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, . . . and in the honest belief that the action taken 
was in the best interests of the company [and its shareholders].’ ”)).
43. In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., Civil Action No. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 
4826104, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011) (“So long as [directors] act within the boundaries of their 
fiduciary duties, judges are ill-suited by training (and should be disinclined by temperament) to sec-
ondguess [sic] the business decisions of those chosen by the stockholders to fulfill precisely that 
function.”).
44. Frederick Hsu Living Tr. v. ODN Holding Corp., No. CV 12108-VCL, 2017 WL 
1437308, at *19 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 2017), as corrected (Apr. 24, 2017) (explaining that the pre-
sumptively long-term fiduciary focus does not require directors to appease a small subset of the 
shareholder base).
45. See, e.g., 6 STUART SPEISER ET AL, AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 18:90 (Monique C.M. 
Leahy ed., 2018) (“Its duty, as the cases indicate, is to take reasonable steps within the limitations of 
cost, technology, and marketability to design and produce a product . . . that will minimize the una-
voidable danger.”); see also Robert J. Rhee, The Tort Foundation of Duty of Care and Business 
Judgment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1139, 1143 (2013) (“Under a correct account of the tort analo-
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formed judgment on appropriate safety steps is generally inoculated from liabil-
ity if an unforeseen injury occur later.46 By the same token, a director will not 
be held liable if the process of reviewing and assessing both the key benefits 
and risks was reasonable to achieve the goal, even if the decision ended up be-
ing wrong and costly.
But historically, the Delaware courts have gone two steps further than just 
imposing a reasonableness-of-process standard to restrict liability on directors. 
First, the BJR states a presumption. Absent fraud or conflict of interest, a direc-
tor is presumed to act in good faith in the best interest of shareholders. The bur-
den shifts to the plaintiff-shareholder to overcome that presumption, and it is 
typically a tough burden indeed.47
Second, there is a demanding burden to actually prove the breach of a fidu-
ciary duty. Delaware courts only allow liability for breach of a duty of care by a 
gross negligence standard and require an even higher “conscious disregard”
(“bad faith”) standard to prove a breach of the duty of loyalty (which is dis-
cussed below).48
For Delaware courts to bend over this far backwards, however, creates a po-
tential problem where long-term consequences should be considered. Directors 
may interpret the best way to take advantage of BJR protection is to game the 
system by cleverly ignoring or not wanting to analyze long-term consequences. 
Indeed, directors may think that such a “see no evil, hear no evil” going-
through-the-motions approach to the decision-making process is better than the 
alternative of proactive searching for information on long-term consequences. 
That perception could only reinforce short-termism bias. Such a result would be 
tragic because it would eviscerate Delaware courts’ express holdings that the 
goal of the director’s duty of loyalty and care should be a maximization of cor-
porate value over the long term for shareholders.
gy, the duty of care and the business judgment rule are not antipodes of a paradox, but are comple-
mentary principles governing duty and its scope.”).
46. Id.
47. Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS.
LAW. 439, 454–55 (2005) (“From this simple statement—and later case law elaboration—several 
undisputed points about the Delaware rule emerge. The rule applies to directors; the rule applies to 
directors when they act collectively, that is, as a board or as a committee of the board; the rule ap-
plies only to considered director judgments, not to unconsidered inaction; directors must be inde-
pendent and disinterested as to the matter acted upon; directors must act with due care and in good 
faith; the due care inquiry is process-oriented and due care is measured by a standard of gross negli-
gence, not simple negligence; the burden of proof is on the party challenging the board’s decision to 
establish facts rebutting the presumption in favor of upholding the decision. Unless a plaintiff suc-
ceeds in rebutting the rule, the court will not substitute its views for those of the board’s if the lat-
ter’s decision can be ‘attributed to any rational business purpose.’ ”) (citations omitted).
48. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
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D. Options for Expanding Directors’ Fiduciary Liability for Failing to 
Undertake Long-Term Strategy Planning and Assessment
Based on the above, there is a clear need for Delaware courts to deal with 
the “elephant in the room.” The extreme short-termism of current corporate de-
cision-making essentially creates an incentive for fraud. Indeed, Enron and oth-
er meltdowns show that fraud is primarily driven by the outgrowth of pressures 
for short-term profitability at the expense of the long-term.49
However, the core question is much bigger than just intentional fraud. 
Long-term risk is a core component of business strategy for a going concern. 
The world is changing: finite resources, toxic waste, and many outside forces 
will dramatically reshape risk for almost every corporation on the planet.50 New 
technologies, evolving consumer behaviors, and a shifting population are also 
long-term risks that corporations cannot ignore.51 In a world where long-term 
risks—and enhanced profitability from research and development—are so im-
portant, such assessment cannot be swept under the table. That is like limiting 
the radar on a supertanker to three miles or less—not looking further out.  No 
matter how well intentioned the directors, the decisions will likely be bad for 
the shareholders in the long-term where it counts. Kicking the long-term can 
down the road by constantly grabbing for short-term results is not a viable solu-
tion. Meanwhile, other jurisdictions around the world have opted not to procras-
tinate and have already amended their corporate laws to require long-term stra-
tegic planning in some form.
For instance, in the United Kingdom there is now an express inclusion of 
the duty of a director to consider “long-term consequences of decisions” as part 
of acting in a way that benefits shareholders as a whole.52 The UK Companies 
Act 2006 states in Section 172 that consideration of long-term consequences is 
one of the requirements the act has “codified [from] the common law and equi-
table duties of directors.”53
49. See, e.g., Salter, supra note 10.
50. See Climate Change and Resource Scarcity, MEGA TRENDS (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
London, U.K.), https://www.pwc.co.uk/issues/megatrends/climate-change-and-resource-
scarcity.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2018).
51. Rob Griffin, William H. Frey, Ruy Teixeira, States of Change: Demographic Shifts, 
Representation Gaps, and America’s Future, BROOKINGS (Mar. 1, 2017), https://
www.brookings.edu/research/states-of-change/. How Will Changing Demographics in the U.S. In-
fluence Business in the Coming Decade?, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 29, 2013, 3:34 PM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/how-will-changing-demographics-in-the-us-influence-business-in-the-
coming-decade-1385757204.
52. See UK Companies Act § 172 (2006) (listing “non-exhaustive factors” for a director to 
consider).
53. Id. at §172(1)(a) (“A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good 
faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as 
a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to. . . [t]he likely consequences of any 
decision in the long term.”).
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What needs to be done now is to frame an investor lawsuit or enact legisla-
tion that ensures this principle gets expressly set forth into Delaware law. Rele-
vant Delaware case law has not squarely addressed the long-term assessment 
issue but rather has focused on more narrow fact situations such as failure of 
directors to discover fraud in the company or failure of directors to monitor for 
noncompliance with legal regulations.
In trying to rebalance the policy arguments in light of the current context of 
extreme short-termism, there is a spectrum of options, which a pension fund or
other long-term investor has the flexibility to choose and pursue in Delaware 
courts. At the conservative end, a plaintiff shareholder could seize upon liability 
buzzwords from current Delaware case law—such as “known risks” or “red 
flags” or “systemic failure to monitor”—as justifying liability for a systemic 
failure to include long-term strategic planning and risk assessment in the deci-
sion-making process. At the more aggressive end, a plaintiff shareholder could 
seek broad Delaware court precedent requiring a general inclusion of long-term 
benefit and risk assessment in order to rationally meet the core goal of direc-
tors—to pursue long-term value maximization for shareholders.
There is also a middle ground: even if the Delaware courts are not ready to 
impose a uniform guideline requirement across all corporations, they may well 
be willing on a fact-specific basis to impose it on companies where: Much of 
the equity value of the company is clearly “future value”; there are clear known 
long-term risks facing the industry sector where the company operates; there are 
significant long-term debt obligations; “research and development” innovation 
is particularly critical to competition in a specific industry sector; the company 
is “too big to fail”; or directors have approved CEO compensation systems that 
highly reward CEOs for short-term performance, but not for long-term results.
To underscore that these are not academic options—but realistic ones—a
brief overview of Delaware’s evolving line of “duty to monitor” cases may be 
instructive.
1. Directors’ Duty to Monitor: The Line of Cases from 
Caremark to Stone v. Ritter
The process of transforming Delaware case law to deal with the systemic 
short-term bias problem is in its formative stages. A good illustration of this 
point is the evolving case law on a director’s duty of loyalty.  Historically, the 
duty of loyalty was defined primarily in negative or passive terms. That in-
cludes historical prohibitions on conflict of interest or fraud by a director. But in 
a line of cases beginning with In re Caremark International, Inc. Derivative Lit-
igation, a more proactive duty of loyalty has emerged.54
54. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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These cases are also called “failure of oversight” cases—implying an af-
firmative duty to monitor important risks as part of the duty of loyalty.55 This 
Caremark line of cases on an affirmative duty of loyalty has largely developed 
in response to a growing list of corporate meltdowns such as during the dot-com 
bust and the financial crisis of 2008. The cases have focused on the outcome of 
those catastrophes—and whether directors failed to adequately monitor fraud or 
legal compliance, which eventually led to major losses.
Obviously, these cases focus more on the symptoms of short-termism, ra-
ther than the problem of short-termism itself.  After all, fraud and lack of legal 
compliance are generally a by-product of strong pressures for short-term profit-
ability. And in these cases, the Delaware courts have only found liability under 
the duty of loyalty where the courts found the director’s inattention or inaction 
in oversight was so egregious that it could be considered disloyal or in bad faith 
to have done nothing.56
That bad faith standard, also called “conscious disregard,” is met when 
there were clear “red flags” or “known risks” that were ignored by directors. 
But even when there were no apparent red flags, Delaware courts have held that 
a breach of a director’s duty of loyalty could be found if there was a “systemic 
failure” to monitor risks, or “utter failure” to put monitoring systems in place 
for fraud or compliance with laws.57
One other principle has also clearly emerged from this line of cases: there is 
no separate duty of good faith; rather it is subsumed under the duty of loyalty.58
Put another way, a director is disloyal to the corporation where she fails to meet 
her duty of care or other duties in bad faith or through conscious disregard of 
known risks.59
The Delaware courts—and in once instance, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit—have addressed a series of uniquely fact-specific 
duty of loyalty cases and, in the process, have articulated these basic principles 
of analysis.
In Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., shareholders brought an action al-
leging the directors had failed to prevent violations of the federal antitrust laws 
55. See generally David P. Bancroft, The Collateral Estoppel and Caremark Consequences 
of Criminal Convictions in Environmental Cases, in CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAWS 137, 146 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, No. SE72, 2000) (“The decision of Delaware Chancery 
Court In re Caremark International Inc., was widely believed by many criminal defense counsel to 
have harbingered an era of director personal liability for a convicted company’s failure to have a 
company compliance program. The prior rule was that directors had no affirmative duty to prevent 
law violations by their company.”).
56. See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of 
Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629 (2010).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 632 n.5, 689–95.
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by Allis-Chalmers employees.60 The Delaware Supreme Court held that, “ab-
sent cause for suspicion, there is no duty upon directors to install and operate a 
corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no rea-
son to suspect exists.”61
In Caremark, shareholders brought an action against the directors, claiming 
they should have known about violations of the federal anti-referral payment 
laws that prohibit health care providers from paying remuneration to induce 
Medicare or Medicaid referrals. The Chancery Court formulated the “systemic 
failure of oversight” standard to apply to the facts and dismissed the case for 
insufficient facts.62
In Abbott Laboratories Derivative Shareholders Litigation, shareholders 
brought an action against directors of the pharmaceutical company for lack of 
oversight after the FDA gave the company repeated warnings about a violation 
before finally hitting the company with huge fines.63 The Seventh Circuit held 
that this exhibited the requisite “systematic failure” to address the FDA issue.64
In Stone v. Ritter, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of a 
shareholder complaint alleging the directors never took the necessary steps to 
ensure reasonable compliance with the federal Bank Secrecy Act relating to 
money laundering.65 The plaintiffs could not establish enough particularized 
evidence of an utter failure to monitor in light of certain steps the company had 
taken to monitor activities prohibited by the Act.66
In In Re Chemed Corporation Derivative Litigation, shareholders argued 
that directors should have known about pervasive, open wrongdoing in the cor-
poration just by virtue of their positions as members of a relevant corporate au-
diting committee that would have naturally gathered and shared information 
about the conduct.67 The Delaware District court rejected this allegation and 
distinguished this situation from Abbott because there the FDA itself put the 
60. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 127 (Del. 1963) (“The complaint 
alleges actual knowledge on the part of the director defendants of the anti-trust conduct upon which 
the indictments were based or, in the alternative, knowledge of facts which should have put them on 
notice of such conduct.”).
61. Id. at 130.
62. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
63. In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 811 (7th Cir. 2003).
64. Id. at 809.
65. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
66. Id. at 373 (“Accordingly, we hold that the Court of Chancery properly ap-
plied Caremark and dismissed the plaintiffs’ derivative complaint for failure to excuse demand by 
alleging particularized facts that created reason to doubt whether the directors had acted in good 
faith in exercising their oversight responsibilities.”).
67. In re Chemed Corp., S’holder Derivative Litig., No. CV 13-1854-LPS-CJB, 2015 WL 
9460118, at *30 (D. Del. Dec. 23, 2015), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. KBC Asset 
Mgmt. NV v. McNamara, No. CV 13-1854-LPS-CJB, 2016 WL 2758256 (D. Del. May 12, 2016) 
(“In the absence of such particularized allegations (or something like them), the asserted pervasive-
ness and duration of the improper billing scheme does not strongly suggest the Board’s bad faith 
intent or knowledge of the conduct.”).
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Abbott board members on notice of corporate violations and required them to 
share the information.68
In Citigroup Shareholder Derivative Litigation, shareholders sued directors 
for failure to monitor “business risk,” specifically exposure to subprime market 
loans.69 Citing insufficient conclusory allegations seeking to link a large loss to 
flawed director oversight, the Chancery Court dismissed the case. The decision 
was critical of any attempts to second-guess decisions in hindsight and urged 
that any cause of action must focus on the particularized flaws in the “process” 
of decision-making instead.70 So this case in no way foreclosed the possibility 
that a failure to adequately monitor business risk would be appropriate.
A recent article by Chief Justrice Strine in the GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
goes through a detailed analysis of the duty of loyalty line of cases with Care-
mark issues of oversight.71 In that article, Chief Justice Strine and his co-authors 
refer to two types of monitoring or oversight cases: one where an actual deci-
sion was made and a second where there was merely unconscious inattention 
given to the problem and no decision was made.72 In the first context, there can 
either be cases where there were “yellow or red flags” or those where there 
were no such warnings.73
Several quotations from this article by Strine and his co-authors make clear 
that the Delaware courts are very actively looking at developing this law:
? “. . .in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, Chan-
cellor Allen underscored the importance of good faith by sending the 
message that a director’s duty of loyalty extended to the increasingly 
important context of monitoring.”74
68. Id. at *34 (“With regard to this assertion, the Court does not doubt that the magnitude 
and duration of alleged misconduct can be a factor that bears on whether it can be reasonably in-
ferred that board members knew of that misconduct. But in Abbott Labs, (as set out above) and in 
the other three cited cases, the alleged facts conveyed a much stronger picture of direct board 
knowledge of misconduct than what is contained in the Plaintiffs’ Complaint. It is those stronger 
facts regarding director knowledge, not present here, that appears to have made the difference in 
those cases as to the issue of demand futility.”).
69. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
70. Id. at 126 (“To the extent the Court allows shareholder plaintiffs to succeed on a theory 
that a director is liable for a failure to monitor business risk, the Court risks undermining the well 
settled policy of Delaware law by inviting Courts to perform a hindsight evaluation of the reasona-
bleness or prudence of directors’ business decisions.”).
71. Strine, supra note 56, at 629.
72. Id. at 695 (“Put simply, there is nothing new about recognizing that a conscious failure to 
make a good faith effort to comply with the required duty of care is categorically distinct from a 
mere failure to fulfill that duty in a specific circumstance.”).
73. Id. at 686 (“In the context where disinterested directors made a specific decision regard-
ing monitoring—such as how to follow up on yellow or red flags suggesting law-compliance prob-
lems—the focus of the loyalty prong of the business judgment rule inquiry was on whether the di-
rectors had undertaken a good faith effort to make a reasoned decision in the interest of the 
corporation.”).
74. Id. at 685.
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? “As he [Chancellor Allen] conceptualized it, directors could be sub-
ject to liability for failing to monitor the ongoing operations of the 
corporation—or, in chancellor Allen’s alternative words, “to exercise 
appropriate attention” in two contexts. . ..”75
? “In the first [context] the board may have made a specific decision 
about a matter.  In that case, the business judgment rule applied.”76
? “In the [first] context where disinterested directors made a specific 
decision regarding monitoring—such as how to follow up on yellow 
or red flags suggesting law-compliance problems—the focus of the 
loyalty prong of this business judgment rule inquiry was on whether 
the directors had undertaken a good faith effort to make a reasoned 
decision in the interest of the corporation.”77
? “The other [second] related context in which the board could face lia-
bility for failure to monitor involved a claim regarding what Chan-
cellor Allen called the board’s ‘unconsidered inaction’ . . . ‘Chancel-
lor Allen famously addressed that context by holding that directors 
had a duty to assure that a corporate information gathering and re-
porting system [] exists which represents a good faith attempt to pro-
vide senior management and the Board with information respecting 
material acts, events, or conditions within the corporation, including 
compliance with applicable statutes and regulations.’78
But, as Strine noted, to avoid disincentivizing directors serving for fear they 
would be blamed for lack of oversight and monitoring of a corporate catastro-
phe, Caremark held that:
“Only a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight—such as 
an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system 
exists—will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liabil-
ity.”79
In light of the highly cautious approach taken to these cases, there is an 
open question whether Delaware courts would impose a duty of loyalty that in-
sists upon systematic long-term strategic planning and accompanying assess-
ments of long-term consequences (both benefits and risks).
On the other hand, failure to proactively insist on long-term strategic plans 
and risk assessment goes to the very core of what a director is supposed to be 
doing. She is supposed to act in the best interests of the shareholders by maxim-
izing long-term profitability and wealth creation. Her duty of loyalty is to act in 
good faith in the best interest of the shareholders. It approaches riverboat gam-
75. Id. (quoting In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 
1996)).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 686.
78. Id. (quoting In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 968–69).
79. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.
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bling to press for profits in the short-term when the long-term risks inherent in 
such a decision are not even considered seriously in the analysis.80 It truly 
would be a systemic failure to fail to attempt to assure that a reasonable long-
term information reporting system exists. And if there are any “yellow flags” or 
“red flags” about long-term risks, that would only heighten the director’s obli-
gation to monitor.
Any reasonable director should be aware of the known risks of failure to 
engage in long-term planning or assessment of long-term consequences.  In-
deed, one can argue that it is much easier to prove conscious disregard and 
breach of loyalty by a director for not assessing long-term consequences in 
good faith than it is in the fraud-monitoring cases in the earlier Caremark line 
of oversight cases where the problem was often hidden. This is particularly true 
if: Much of the value of the corporation is tied up in future value, there is little 
in the way of research and development, the directors are approving a large 
compensation package for a CEO based on short-term profitability criteria, or 
there is no long-term strategic plan or assessment of long-term risks related to 
decisions made to create short-term profitability. In other words, the whole de-
cision-making process is systemically biased toward short-term thinking, and 
there is no offsetting strategic analysis of what is given up in the long-term.
On a principled basis, imposing liability in this fact situation would not pe-
nalize a good director. Every industry has a known set of at least four or five 
major risks.81 It is essential to have a coherent long-term strategy for investment 
that deals with risks and opportunities if long-term value maximization—
particularly future value—is to occur. It is unfortunately the line of least re-
sistance to grab short-term profits at the expense of the long-term for the com-
pany. The symptoms of short-termism, such as the very internal fraud and lack 
of legal compliance that were featured in the Caremark line of cases, should 
diminish substantially if long-term assessment of consequences is in place.
III. WHY EXTENSION OF THE DUTY OF LOYALTY TO INSISTENCE ON LONG-TERM 
ANALYSIS SHOULD NOT BE A JUDICIAL OVERREACH
Delaware courts could impose a duty of loyalty on directors to deal with the 
short-termism problem. The question is whether they will let the directors off 
the hook, out of deference to the long-standing BJR.82
Short-termism refers to a process of decision-making that concretely fails to 
weigh long-term consequences (good or bad).83 There are several reasons why 
80. One only need look at the subprime mortgage profits fiasco to see this problem. See The 
2008 Financial Crisis, supra note 14.
81. Industries can easily have dozens or hundreds of major risks, but for the sake of planning 
it should be limited to only reasonably foreseeable risks.
82. See Johnson, supra note 47.
83. Emeka Duruigbo, Tackling Shareholder Short-Termism and Managerial Myopia, 100 
KY. L.J. 531, 531 (2012) (“Short-termism denotes the phenomenon by which some corporate man-
agers, responding to pressure from investors or acting to bolster their own position, advert their at-
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Delaware courts could expand their previous precedent to hold directors ac-
countable for a short-term bias that ignores long-term consequences, despite the 
presumption of the BJR.
First, short-termism is a logically and inherently flawed decision-making 
process if there is no systematic assessment of long-term consequences (good or 
bad). In balancing benefits and risks—the failure to include vital risks (and ben-
efits) creates inherent bias—no matter how well meaning the directors may be. 
When those decisions involve lots of other people’s money, that is a big prob-
lem.
Second, a mere Delaware court-imposed guideline insisting on systematic 
long-term assessment in connection with major investment decisions does not 
trigger the traditional reasons that Delaware courts use to justify BJR re-
strictions on liability. Imposing a duty to monitor long-term consequences as 
part of the decision-making process in no way is “second-guessing” the judg-
ments that come out of that process.84 A director may still make a short-term-
oriented profit decision, but at least he is not ill-informed when he makes that 
decision. There is no conclusion that a loss occurred and therefore the process 
must be flawed.85 The only way a causal connection can be established for lia-
bility is if there was a systematic failure—as there appears to be in most U.S. 
corporations—to even have a long-term strategy or assessment. Nor would there 
be a chilling effect on people interested in serving on corporate boards. Insisting 
on a long-term assessment as part of overall corporate decisions should make a 
rational director more comfortable, not less so.86 And indeed the presence of a 
protocol for long-term strategy and assessment can inoculate that director from 
liability. Finally, it does not impose “best practices” on directors. Establishing a 
duty to monitor long-term consequences as part of a decision-making process is 
tention and exert their energies to achieving short-term profitability, virtually eschewing longer-
term considerations.”); Kenneth McNeil & Richard Miller, The Profitability of Consumer Protec-
tion: Warranty Policy in the Auto Industry, 25 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 407, 407–427 (Sept., 1980) (The Na-
tional Science Foundation funded this study of the auto industry while Japanese automobile manu-
facturers were dramatically increasing their market share in the U.S. market. Through market 
surveys, the study documents how short-term bias in accounting systems blinded American auto 
manufacturers to the long-term risks of destroying customer loyalty over time through product de-
fects and poor repair service—a blindness that could easily have been cured by systemic long-term 
risk assessment and monitoring tools).
84. A. Christine Hurt, The Duty to Manage Risk, 39 J. CORP. L. 253, 257 (2014) (“Courts 
will look not at the substance of decisions, but to whether boards were rational in their decision-
making processes.”). See also Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Reconsidering Board Oversight 
Duties After the Financial Crisis, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 859, 862 (2013) (“Chancellor Chandler was 
clearly quite reluctant to recognize a duty to monitor general business risk, fearing that such a duty 
would lead to judicial second-guessing of board decisions, precisely the sort of second-guessing that 
the business judgment rule is meant to block.”).
85. Id.
86. See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Be-
havioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1737–38 n.3 (2001) (reviewing 
and summarizing citations to rational corporate director theory and economic behavior).
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not a matter of best practices.87 This duty is merely to insist on some systematic 
assessment. That is different from the current situation, where there is often no
systematic assessment of long-term consequences; and there is conduct totally 
incompatible with long-term durable wealth creation and value maximization 
for the shareholder.
Third, merely hiring “disinterested directors” does not obviate a duty to 
monitor long-term consequences as part of a decision-making process. In the 
past, Delaware courts have looked to independent directors as more rational and 
less biased. But even disinterested directors will make flawed decisions without 
adequate information on long-term, as well as short-term, considerations that 
affect long-term wealth of the corporation.
Fourth, Delaware courts have already crossed the bridge of imposing “pro-
active” duties on directors. The old prohibitions on “fraud and conflict of inter-
est” are negative constraints. But courts have made clear that director obliga-
tions also require “positive” or “proactive” steps by directors, such as in
monitoring and assessing information.
Even if Delaware courts insisted on tying this duty more closely to existing 
law on “duty to monitor,” the assessment of long-term consequences appear to 
fall squarely within that scope of liability found for those cases involving red 
flags or ignoring known risks; or systemic (meaning repeated and complete) 
failure to monitor compliance with laws. Failure to do any long-term strategic 
assessment on an ongoing basis clearly would be a red flag or a known risk in 
today’s world. And total failure to do long-term planning appears to be a sys-
temic failure.  Following this logic, a principled analysis for imposing a strate-
gic duty to look at long-term consequences could look something like the fol-
lowing:
If a reasonable process for developing that long-term strategy and assess-
ment (or “means”) is totally missing from a particular corporate decision where 
that information would be material and relevant to a major decision, then a 
plaintiff should be allowed to survive a motion to dismiss if:
(1) Plaintiff can show that a reasonable strategic plan and assessment met-
rics were not in place to address those long-term consequences when 
the flawed decision was actually made that led to major losses;
(2) If they had been in place, that important material and relevant infor-
mation would have been available to issue strong red flag warnings; 
and
(3) If those red flags had been raised, no decision could have reasonably 
been made that would have resulted in the losses without bad faith or 
conscious disregard of the duty of loyalty’s obligation to engage in a 
systematic assessment of long-term strategy.
87. William W. Bratton, Lyondell: A Note of Approbation, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 561, 562 
(2011) (describing the difficulty of imposing best practice liability on corporate decision-making).
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With this type of “principled analysis” test, it should benefit a company to 
have long-term strategic plans in place, because the director could protect her-
self by easily justifying that:
(1) A long-term strategic plan and assessment systems were in place that 
addressed the known risks of a decision that, in hindsight, turned out 
to be bad and created losses;
(2) The board had the benefit of that long-term thinking about “conse-
quences” that had gone into those plans before making that decision; 
and
(3) A good faith “process” set up by the board therefore inoculates it 
against any liability for later loss in a way that restores balance to a 
reasonable process while protecting the director from liability for a 
bad decision.
If boards of directors do not insist on longer-term strategic plans and related 
assessment monitoring, and the inherent business risks were not analyzed in 
terms of such a long-term strategy and assessment, then:
(1) The plaintiff could plead the three steps above with particularly; and
(2) The BJR rule should not protect directors from liability for making 
such decisions about other people’s money where the decision was 
made strictly in light of short-term risks and benefits, with no consid-
eration of offsetting strategies for maximizing longer-term benefits 
and minimizing longer-term risks, and that process (if it had been in 
place) would likely have made a difference in the decision made.
Nevertheless, whatever option is selected, something needs to be done. It 
will take a carefully pled case for the Delaware courts to fill the gap between 
what they have said is the goal of director decision-making—and the actual du-
ties of directors under the BJR.
But once the gap is filled, corporate counsel will automatically push boards 
to plan for the long-term, driving sustainable value creation and making share-
holder-company engagements much more effective.88 All indications are that—
88. For example, depending on the industry, such a plan may include processes for:
? strategic and scenario planning 5 to 15 years into the future;
? setting 5- to 10-year strategic goals and targets;
? assessing risk to the current business model 5 to 15 years into future;
? long-term incentive compensation plan goals and pay for performance aligned with 5-year 
or longer goals;
? research and development and innovation reporting on realizing future value;
? reporting on relative research and development investment compared to peers;
? measuring and reporting on capital efficiency (such as return on equity or return on invest-
ed capital) over 10 years;
? measuring and reporting future value;
? reporting on CEO and named officer succession planning aligned to strategy for the next 10 
years;
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when a truly respected long-term investor with a creative lawsuit arrives—
Delaware courts would be eager to use it to frame policy to achieve the very 
goals Chief Justice Strine describes: building long-term, durable wealth and 
aligning corporations with overall goals for societal economic prosperity.
IV. THE MAJOR CONSEQUENCES OF FAILING TO FILL THIS GAP IN THE LAW
This question of controlling direct decision-making to protect long-term 
shareholder interests is not academic. Indeed, the real economic stakes of solv-
ing this problem grow ever more enormous, and the impact is increasingly 
global.
The impact of short-termism can be disastrous, whether seen from the per-
spective of a liberal or conservative economist. For example, a Credit Suisse 
report shows that that one percent of the world’s population owns half the 
world’s wealth, and the disparity is increasing.89 In the United States, the 
wealthiest one percent have seen their share increase to nearly a quarter of all 
the country’s wealth, while the poorest have less than five percent.90
Edward Conard, founding partner of Bain capital and a conservative eco-
nomic writer, justifies this inequality and related tax breaks for the rich on a key 
predicate91: This wealth and tax breaks foster innovation—research and devel-
opment. That, in turn, creates jobs and economic growth, which creates a multi-
plier effect where more people with more jobs get trained in better skills. There-
fore, he reasons, everyone benefits.
Yet, Credit Suisse research and other data show that such innovation is not 
happening in the top 1500 corporations. Research and development investments 
seem confined to only about 100 of the top 1500.92 Indeed, research done at the 
International Monetary Fund indicates that high levels of persistent income ine-
quality are associated with reduced economic growth, macroeconomic instabil-
ity, concentrated political and decision-making power, suboptimal use of human 
resources, political and economic instability, and increased crisis risk.93 If any 
of this is true, Conard’s logic falls on its face.
? the CEO role profile defined relative to 10- to 20-year strategy; and
? assessing talent with potential for C-Suite leadership in 10 to 15 years.
89. Rupert Neate, Richest 1% Own Half the World’s Wealth, Study Finds, GUARDIAN (Nov. 
14, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/inequality/2017/nov/14/worlds-richest-wealth-credit-
suisse.
90. Id.
91. See generally EDWARD CONARD, THE UPSIDE OF INEQUALITY: HOW GOOD INTENTION 
UNDERMINES THE MIDDLE CLASS (Penguin Random House ed., 2016).
92. Neate, supra note 89.
93. INT’L MONETARY FUND, CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF INCOME INEQUALITY: A
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 7 (2013), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2015/sdn1513.pdf (“If 
the income share of the top 20 percent increases by one percentage point, GDP growth is actually 
0.08 percentage point lower in the following five years, suggesting that the benefits do not trickle 
down. Instead, a similar increase in the income share of the bottom 20 percent (the poor) is associat-
ed with 0.38 percentage point higher growth.”) (original emphasis).
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In this light, it is no surprise that Chief Justice Strine is strident about these 
issues of control of corporate decision-making for societal growth and well-
being. One need look no further than how Strine reinforces his concerns in a 
pair of very recent law review articles from Yale and Harvard:
Most Americans have become “forced capitalists” who must – by virtue of 
government tax and retirement policies – give over a large portion of their wealth 
to the stock market to fund their retirements and their children’s educations.  As a 
result, the actual human beings whose capital is invested by these intermediaries do 
not directly vote on who sits on corporate boards, do not have the option to buy and 
sell the securities of particular companies in their 401(k) programs, and retain only 
very limited rights of exit from the market without facing expropriatory levels of 
taxation.94
[T]he leading corporate law in the United States, that of Delaware, re-
quires corporate directors to manage the corporation in the best interests of the cor-
poration’s stockholders. . . . This, of course, does not mean that the board must al-
ways bend to the whims of any momentary stockholder majority, but it does mean 
that the directors must govern the corporation so as to generate the most sustainable 
profitability for the corporation’s equity owners. . . . Under that structure, only 
stockholders are entitled to elect directors, vote on important transactions, sue to 
enforce fiduciary duties, and exercise other statutory rights. Put simply, they are the 
only constituency given power over the board.95
Strine’s call here is clear and to the point: pension funds that represent these 
millions of beneficiaries should step up and exercise their responsibilities.96
And a key way to do so is by helping Delaware courts develop the rules of the 
road for a new world where long-term consequences will rule the day, whether 
corporations plan for it or not.
V. SUPPLEMENTING LONG-TERM INVESTORS’ TRADITIONAL REFORM 
STRATEGIES USING THE DELAWARE BOOKS AND RECORDS STATUTE.
Investors are not confined to just filing a lawsuit in Delaware courts to 
frame legal issues for reform in the process of corporate decision-making to 
conform to long-term goals rather than extreme short-termism. It is not uncom-
mon for a Delaware Court to order that a shareholder be allowed to inspect 
books and records under Delaware General Corporation Law § 220 to investi-
94. Strine, supra note 13, at 444.
95. Id. at 440–41.
96. Id. at 443–44 (“Most of the stock of American public corporations is no longer owned
directly by human beings but is instead owned by institutional investors such as mutual or pension 
funds.”) (citation omitted).
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gate and evaluate wrongful conduct.97 The text of § 220 spells out this proce-
dure.98
A long-term investor’s use of the Delaware statute on books and records in-
spections can accomplish two goals at the same time. First, it can enable access 
to detailed internal company documents necessary to investigate just how much 
monitoring and assessment is being done, as part of determining whether direc-
tors have ignored their duty to assess long-term consequences. Second, it pro-
vides a potential “disclosure” remedy producing more transparency on what ex-
actly is going on, allowing efforts at cooperative engagement to be more 
meaningful.
Some of the types of purposes for which the books and records can be di-
rected are spelled out in a recent Delaware case: Louisiana Municipal Police 
Employees Retirement System v. Morgan Stanley.99 In that case, a pension fund 
(“LAMPERS”) sought to inspect the books and records of Morgan Stanley to 
determine whether the appropriate legal strategy had been taken “arising out of 
the company’s involvement with auction rate securities.”100 The court granted 
the inspection except for information that was not reasonably required. Further, 
the court cited a treatise101 and quoted a number of independent grounds for the 
requisite statutory showing of “proper purpose.”102
97. See 1 EDWARD P. WELCH ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION 
LAW § 220.6.3, at GCL–VII–202–209 (5th ed. 2010 Supp.) (internal footnotes omitted), quoted in
City of Westland Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Axcelis Techs., Inc., 1 A.3d 281, 289 n.30 (Del.2010).
98. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (West 2010).
99. La. Mun. Police Emp.’s Ret. Sys. v. Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc., No. C.A. 5682-VCL, 
2011 WL 773316, at *6 (Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 2011).
100. Id. at *2.
101. Id. at *6 (citing WELCH ET AL., supra note 97, at GCL–VII–202–206).
102. Id. (citing WELCH ET AL., supra note 97, at GCL–VII–202–206). These grounds include 
a shareholder’s desire to:
? investigate allegedly improper transactions or mismanagement;
? clarify an unexplained discrepancy in the corporation’s financial statements regarding as-
sets;
? investigate the possibility of an improper transfer of assets out of the corporation;
? ascertain the value of stock;
? aid in litigation instituted to contact other stockholders regarding litigation and invite their 
association in the case;
? inform fellow shareholders of one’s view concerning the wisdom or fairness, from the point 
of view of the shareholders, of a proposed recapitalization and encourage fellow sharehold-
ers to seek appraisal;
? discuss corporate finances and management’s inadequacies and then, depending on the re-
sponses, determine stockholder sentiment for either a change in management or a sale pur-
suant to a tender offer;
? inquire into the independence, good faith, and due care of a special committee formed to 
consider a demand to institute derivative litigation;
? communicate with other stockholders regarding a tender offer;
? communicate with other stockholders in order to effectuate changes in management poli-
cies;
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Indeed, Delaware courts encourage plaintiff-shareholders to use this proce-
dure when considering derivative litigation. Records inspections can help the 
shareholder plead facts with enough particularity to overcome the shareholder 
derivative futility requirement.
In Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo!, the plaintiff-shareholders’ initial com-
plaint based on Yahoo!’s questionable executive compensation decisions 
failed.103 They then used § 220 to obtain books and records necessary to file an 
amended complaint.104 The information the shareholders obtained from that re-
quest helped their complaint survive dismissal in a case that was factually—and 
procedurally—similar to the famous Disney case regarding Michael Ovitz’s ex-
ecutive compensation package.
Given the Delaware judiciary’s consistent statements about the need to ad-
dress short-term forces in the corporate governance system, a corporation’s lack 
of reasonable reporting on durable long-term business planning and risk man-
agement practices should be a proper purpose for gaining access to related 
company books and records. Decisions on company refusals to allow books and 
records demands would provide an avenue for Delaware courts to clarify corre-
sponding director duties.
CONCLUSION
The short-termism problem and its consequences are systemic. For exam-
ple, funding at some public pension funds is under 50 percent of liabilities.105
While the causes of such underfunding are multifaceted, the situation is unsus-
? investigate the stockholder’s possible entitlement to oversubscription privileges in connec-
tion with a rights offering;
? determine an individual’s suitability to serve as a director;
? obtain names and addresses of stockholders for a contemplated proxy solicitation; or
? obtain particularized facts needed to adequately allege demand futility after the corporation 
has admitted engaging in backdating stock options.
103. Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo! Inc., 132 A.3d 752, 777 (Del. Ch. 2016) (“The trustee for 
an index fund has analogous authority. In this case, Amalgamated even provided decisions by this 
court recognizing its authority to make Section 220 demands on behalf of funds for which it served 
as trustee. Amalgamated satisfied the form and manner requirements . . . . Amalgamated’s Demand 
described the purposes for the inspection as follows: Amalgamated is making this Demand to: (1) 
investigate Yahoo’s payment of what appears to be excessive compensation to Yahoo’s former 
Chief Operating Officer (“COO”), Henrique de Castro (“Mr. de Castro”); (2) assess the independ-
ence of the non-management members of Yahoo’s Board, including the members of the Compensa-
tion and Leadership Development Committee (the “Compensation Committee”), who would have 
approved any compensation paid to Mr. de Castro; and (3) investigate the circumstances surround-
ing Mr. de Castro’s departure from the Company.”).
104. Id. at 799.
105. According to the Pew Charitable Trusts, aggregate funded ratios of state public pension 
plans dropped to 72 percent in 2015 from 75 percent in 2014. Funded ratios ranged from 37 percent 
in New Jersey to 104 percent in South Dakota. Greg Mennis, Measuring the Fiscal Health of State 
Pension Plans, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (July 19, 2017), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/analysis/2017/07/19/measuring-the-fiscal-health-of-state-pension-plans.
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tainable. But the problem can be solved. Studies show corporate profits can al-
most double when a corporation has long-term planning.106 The problem truly 
presents a shared opportunity for long-term investors like pension funds and 
companies to build a stronger economy and benefit both corporations and their 
investors, including the beneficiaries of the pension funds themselves.
Courts cannot unilaterally change corporate conduct. But Delaware courts 
can provide a critical “rudder” for steering corporate directors in a new direc-
tion, if long-term investors assist the Delaware courts in making new law by 
bringing appropriate cases that raise these issues. Delaware courts are aggres-
sively trying to solve the short-termism problem and are looking for creative 
ways to do it.
Unfortunately, all the Delaware courts can do is to encourage such lawsuits 
to be brought.  Chief Justice Strine has clearly sought such assistance from 
long-term institutional investors and chastised them for not being more aggres-
sive in pushing for long-term sustainable wealth creation.107 There would be no 
better time to bring such litigation than when a court encourages it.
Moreover, responsible corporate directors with a clear view of the require-
ments for durable wealth creation should welcome further clarity on their stra-
tegic planning and risk management duties. Balancing long-term considerations 
against short-term pressures can only help corporations increase profitability 
and reduce risks.
106. See VAN CLIEAF ET AL., supra note 5, at 36–44.
107. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspec-
tive on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870,
1970 (2017) (“If empowering short-term investors turns out to be optimal for our society and its 
human citizens, that seems like a very improbable and unsustainable triumph of the law of unin-
tended consequences. Call me old-fashioned, but it would be more comforting to know that those 
with the power over the capital—equity, debt, and most important, labor—of ordinary Americans 
were duty-bound to align their thoughts and actions with those they supposedly represent.”) (em-
phasis added).
